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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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DATE 2007

VIA: ATR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA ROUTE)

DISPATCH NO. CEBA-799

CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WE

DATE 28 September 1953

FROM

MICROFILMED

APR 1 1963

DOC. MICRO. SER.

SUBJECT: GENERAL— REDSKIN/NIGHTWATCH

SPECIFIC— Project Outline

REF: Para. 8, CEBA-685; ECHA-6805; CEBW-510

1. On 28 August 1953 at 1930 hours [redacted] met CAPISTA/2 in the empty office of #5 on the list mentioned in para. 32, CEBA-397 and attached to that report, at 43 Leocoldstraat, Louvain. The building at this address is entirely occupied by a medical clinic and doctors' offices.
2. A detailed discussion of CAPISTA/2's paper on defection-inducement (Attachment, ECHA-6805) revealed that CAPISTA/1 personnel in Louvain might be more securely and effectively exploited in REDSKIN-recruitment operations in Antwerp than in REDCAP operations in Brussels. [redacted] then described to CAPISTA/2 both the personnel requirements (3-4 teams of 2-3 sub-agents each, a reports-officer, and a principal-agent) and the operational methods (based largely on Operational Aid No. 52-14 adapted to local conditions) for a project to recruit Soviet merchant-marine personnel in the Port of Antwerp. CAPISTA/2 agreed that the personnel requirements could be met from CAPISTA/1 personnel in Louvain provided that satisfactory arrangements could be made for their security. Further discussion convinced CAPISTA/2 that the security requirements could also be met and at the conclusion of the meeting he agreed to designate #6 on the list mentioned in para. 1 above as principal-agent for the operation.
3. Since it directly concerned the security of the CAPISTA/1 organization in Louvain, [redacted] also questioned CAPISTA/2 about the Vladimir DOVGALENKO Incident (CEBA-648). During the discussion of this affair, CAPISTA/2 also described the incident of 23 December 1952 at the Home des Etudiants Eyselo-russes (paras. 9-12, CEBA-397). The following points of interest emerged:

2 ENCL. NSM

INDEX

SECRET
Security Information
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR 1949

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/s. CAPISTA/2

28 Sept 53

- a. CAEISTA/2 maintains friendly and mutually-helpful relations with ☒ ☐
- b. Following the incident of 23 December 1952, CAEISTA/2 undertook an investigation of Nikolai SCHUST and determined, to his own satisfaction at least, that SCHUST maintained no questionable or compromising relations (para. 36f, CEFA-397). (Comment: it now appears that CAEISTA/2 himself, not SCHUST, was the source of the 9 February 1953 ☐ ☐ report attached to CEFA-397. It was suspected as long ago as November 1950 (RUS-589) that CAEISTA/2 was in contact with the ☐ ☐ and it now turns out that this contact amounts to a mutually-beneficial exchange of information: ☐ ☐ tells CAEISTA/2 of any threats to the security of CAEISTA/1 and in return CAEISTA/2 keeps ☐ ☐ informed on local CAEISTA/1 affairs).
- c. CAEISTA/2 was the source of the ☐ ☐ report on DOV-GALEKO (Attachment, CEFA-648).
4. Following the first meeting with CAEISTA/2, ☐ ☐ began to assemble operational data for the project, including a list of ☐ ☐ informants in Antwerp (from the material acquired on the occasion of WEBA-931), a list of Soviet contacts (from the EVOLUTION and CATALOGUE cases), Soviet crew-lists, the recent HIERSTEINER reports, the officers of the Soviet Maritime Inspection Service, Soviet merchant-marine officers stationed more-or-less permanently in Antwerp (from the Kasimierz GLETOWSKI reports, para. 4, CEFA-456), etc. On 17 September 1953 the ☐ ☐ submitted the attached, completely unsolicited report on Belgian regulations governing shore-leave for foreign seamen. The attached data on the movement of Soviet ships in and out of the Port of Antwerp has been compiled from Lloyd Anversois. On the basis of the foregoing material, it will be possible, in the first stage of the operation, to brief the CAEISTA/1 teams on whom and what to avoid, and, in the latter stages, on whom and what to seek.
5. The second meeting with CAEISTA/2 occurred on 10 September 1953 at the same location. The person whom CAEISTA/1 had designated as principal-agent for the project was also present. The latter had been thoroughly briefed on the project by CAEISTA/2 and had tentatively selected a reports-officer and three teams of two agents each for the operation. The discussion, therefore, turned largely on questions of security, and the conclusions reached are all embodied in paras. 3c, 5 and 6 of the attached Project Outline. ☐ ☐ was particularly impressed with both the acumen and caution

/displayed by

☐ ☐

CEIA-799

page 3

displayed by the principal-agent in his approach to the problem. The only point on which complete agreement was not reached was the disposition of the reports submitted by the agent-teams. [] was not able to convince CA-BISTA/2 that keeping a copy of the reports in Louvain was unnecessary security risk. It was tentatively decided, therefore, that CA-FISIA/1 copies of the reports would be kept in a three-way combination safe of local manufacture in the office where the meetings were held. There will, of course, be no indication in the reports of KUFIRE sponsorship; this information will be limited to CA-BISTA/2 and the principal-agent, both of whom know [] only as []. Aside from buying a safe, finances were not discussed at all, but it is assumed in the Project Outline that KUFIRE will pay the expenses of the agent-teams, but no salaries.

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Attachments:

1 Project Outline

1 [] Report X-7751 (15 September 1953)

Soviet Ship Movements (Port of Antwerp) (*received*)

Distribution:

Headquarters - 3 (w/atts as noted)

File - 3 (w/1 copy atts)

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PROJECT OUTLINE

PROJECT CRYPTONYM NIGHTWATCH

RECOMMENDED BY: [

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Date

28 Sept 1953

of Mission

Date

30 Sept 1953

ENCL 1 to ODBA-777

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PROJECT OUTLINE

CRYPTONYM: NIGHTWATCH

PART I

1. Area of Operations:

Belgium, Port of Antwerp.

2. References:

As part of the REDSKIN program, Project NIGHTWATCH is related to all similar projects which are aimed directly at the recruitment and exploitation of "Persons...connected with commercial shipping into Soviet ports" (Field Instruction No. 52-4). It is also related to Operation ABQUOP (MOMA-4900, etc), but only in the fact that its contact and recruiting agents will be drawn from CAMPISTA/1.

3. Purpose:

a. Objectives:

The immediate objectives of the operation are to establish and exploit contacts between CAMPISTA/1 personnel at the University of Louvain and Soviet merchant-marine officers and seamen calling at the Port of Antwerp for the ultimate purpose of recruiting the latter as intelligence agents or couriers, or of effecting their outright defection.

b. Targets:

Soviet merchant-marine officers and seamen.

c. Tasks:

The tasks of Project NIGHTWATCH are threefold:

(1) Collection of operational data:

In the first phase of the operation, both the time and circumstances under which the target personalities are granted shore-leave and the places and persons whom they visit will be subjected to close investigation. This phase of the operation will be limited to observation only; no questions will be asked and no contacts

SECRET CONTROL

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made. Until proved otherwise, it will be assumed that every target personality is under constant surveillance by the opposition and that everyone else is an agent provocateur.

(2) Recruitment of support personnel:

The second phase of the operation will be directed toward the recruitment of persons already observed to be in contact with target personalities: harbor officials, stevedores, ship chandlers, sailors of other nationalities, waiters, girls, clerks, etc.

(3) Recruitment of target personnel:

The final phase of the operation will be to utilize persons already recruited to establish direct contact between CAMFISTA/1 personnel and target personalities. In some cases, of course, the CAMFISTA/1 personnel will be able to contact target personalities without the mediation of support personnel.

4. Personnel:

a. Cryptonyms:

Agents available for this operation include all those whose names appear on the list mentioned in para. 32 of OFPA-397 and attached to that report. CAMFISTA/2 has already designated #6 on that list to function as principal agent. The latter and CAMFISTA/2 have also tentatively selected three teams of two agents each and one reports officer. These will be designated by the NIGHTWATCH cryptonym followed by their number on the list mentioned above.

b. Personal data:

Personal data on CAMFISTA/2 is already available in Headquarters. Data on the other agent personalities will be submitted when their assignment to the operation is made definite.

5. Cover:

a. Case-officer in contact with principal-agent:

Cover for the case-officer's meetings with the principal-agent will have to be manufactured. The tentative plan is to use the

SECRET CONTROL

U. S. GOVERNMENT

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case-officer's acquaintance with William V. O'CONNOR, professor of American literature at the University of Minnesota, who will spend the year 1953-54 in Belgium on a Fulbright Fellowship. If an invitation for him to lecture at the University of Louvain can be arranged, this would enable case-officer and principal agent to meet publicly which, in turn, would provide some slight pretext for subsequent meetings (none of which, however, will be held in public).

b. By the agents performing operational tasks:

The CAMFISTA teams' first sorties to Antwerp will be devoted to an investigation of library facilities, museums, information centers, etc. Actual visits to these will provide cover for subsequent trips. To avoid the establishment of patterns in their displacements from Louvain, the CAMFISTA teams will vary both their means of travel (train, bus, hitch-hiking) and their routes (Louvain-Antwerp direct, Louvain-Brussels-Antwerp, Louvain-Marschot-Antwerp). In their actual work in the Antwerp docks areas, the agents will adopt pseudonyms, which, if it proves practical, can be supported by false identity cards. They will also benefit from the normal latitude accorded to student leisure activities.

6. Contact and Communications:

a. Between case-officer and principal-agent:

Contact between case-officer and principal-agent will ordinarily be made after business-hours in the office of [] []. Selection of a safe-apartment in Louvain is also under consideration. In addition, the following open code has been agreed upon for use in an alternate means of communication by mail and an emergency means of communication by telephone:

Soviet merchant marine officer:	professeur
Soviet seaman:	universitaire
politruk:	concierge
Antwerp:	Bruxelles
[] []	appariteur
CAMFISTA/1 personnel:	etudiants
dark or dark area:	universite
ship:	navire

b. Between principal-agent and sub-agents:

Since the principal-agent and the sub-agents are in daily, routine contact, there is no problem of communication here. There is, however, a security problem and the necessity for

SECRET

secrecy and strict compartmentation between agent-teams is recognized by the principal-agent, who is as anxious as the case-officer to protect the position of the sub-agents in Belgium.

c. Special problems of communication:

None.

7. Control:

Control of the principal-agent and sub-agents depends wholly upon the willing cooperation of CAMFISTA/2 who is both eager to attack the Soviets and anxious to engage the students in his charge in positive "political" activity. It was CAMFISTA/2 himself who proposed that his group might undertake "Surveillance of incoming ships and attempt to make contact with the crews" (Attachment, ECMA-6805). CAMFISTA/2's willing cooperation, in turn, depends in part at least on the amount and kind of professional guidance which he and his group receive from KUPIRE. Hence the preliminary discussions with him have been concerned wholly with details of security and operational techniques. CAMFISTA/2 recognizes that an operation such as he envisaged would be impossible without KUPIRE briefing and support.

8. Special equipment:

None at present. If the operation is successful, all the special equipment necessary for the dispatch of a traditional legal agent will be required.

9. Coordination:

In view of existing relations between KUPARK and CAMFISTA/1, coordination with Munich will be necessary. *done*

10. Timetable:

The earliest date on which the first agent-team can be dispatched is 15 October 1953. It is impossible, however, to assign even tentative dates to the three phases of the operation described in para. 3c above.

SECRET CONTROL

SECRET
U. S. -5-
PART II

11. Estimated cost:

For the fiscal year 1 October 1953 - 30 September 1954 costs are estimated as follows:

Travel of sub-agents.....	11,250 francs
Incidental expenses of sub-agents.....	15,000
Safe-house (rent and utilities).....	72,000
Operational supplies.....	<u>10,000</u>
	108,250 francs
	or
	\$2165.00

12. Special Problems and Commitments:

None. *See cover sheet*

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